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INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 1960, thousands of people gathered outside a police 
station in the town of Sharpeville, South Africa.1 The majority of 
individuals in the crowd were protesting the government’s mandate that 
all black South Africans carry a “passbook,” a government issued form of 
identification.2 According to the police reports, protestors began to throw 
stones at officers in an attempt to force their way into the police station.3 
The police opened fire on the protestors in response, and when the firing 
ceased approximately two minutes later, 69 people were dead.4 Instances 
such as the massacre in Sharpeville were not uncommon in apartheid5 
South Africa.6  
In 2002, a number of apartheid victims brought suit in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging both 
direct and secondary tort liability for violations of international law.7 
Interestingly, the claimants did not seek to hold the South African 
government, policemen, or other perpetrators of violence liable.8 Instead, 
the claimants sued, among others, International Business Machines 
Corporation (“IBM”) and Ford Motor Company—two U.S. corporations 
conducting business in South Africa.9 The United States Second Circuit 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2016, by DUSTIN COOPER. 
 1. See Sharpeville Massacre, 21 March 1960, S. AFR. HIST. ONLINE, 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/sharpeville-massacre-21-march-1960 
[https://perma.cc/5PBJ-5C3K] (last updated Jun. 21, 2016). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. In the late 1940s, the South African Government instituted a separation 
of the races, beginning with classification and anti-miscegenation laws. These 
actions proceeded to geographic segregation. Subsequently, the Bantu Authorities 
Act of 1951 created “homelands.” Black South Africans were forcibly removed 
to the homelands the Act created and were then stripped of their South African 
citizenship. This system of separation is known as “apartheid.” See generally 
South Africa Profile – Timeline, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
14094918 [https://perma.cc/4XQD-YNS9] (last updated Jun. 25, 2015). 
 6. See States of Emergency in South Africa: The 1960s and 1980s, S. AFR. 
HIST. ONLINE, http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/state-emergency-south-africa-
1960-and-1980s [https://perma.cc/66RD-PDMT] (last updated Oct. 10, 2013). 
 7. See In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 8. See id. 
 9. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that IBM trained South African government 
employees to use IBM hardware and software to create identity materials, such as 
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Court of Appeals heard the plaintiffs’ plea for relief almost 15 years after 
suit was originally filed.10 The court was tasked with determining whether 
United States federal courts have jurisdiction over international matters 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, commonly referred to as the Alien Tort Statute 
(“ATS”).11 
The ATS is a jurisdictional provision, providing in full, “The district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”12 The First Congress in 1789 enacted this statute, not long 
after the ratification of the Constitution, but the ATS has largely lain 
dormant for almost two centuries.13 Beginning in the 1980s, however, the 
Supreme Court breathed new life into the ATS,14 eventually waking the 
proverbial sleeping giant. Courts have subsequently used this 33-word, 
one-sentence statute to hold individuals and corporations liable for their 
actions overseas that concern issues such as the apartheid in South 
Africa,15 child slavery in the Ivory Coast,16 and the torture of individuals 
in Iraq.17 The implications of the statute as applied to international 
business activities were likely unimaginable to the members of the First 
Congress who enacted the statute in the 18th century. 
Courts and corporations need clear guidance for when such matters 
can be adjudicated in the United States. U.S. corporations are increasingly 
conducting business overseas,18 which could mean that U.S. corporate 
activity affects more non-citizens and that the ATS will be increasingly 
utilized as a form of redress for foreign nationals. This potential increase 
                                                                                                             
those that were the subject of protest in Sharpeville. The allegations against Ford 
were that it assisted the South African government in obtaining vehicles that were 
used to aid in the persecution of the plaintiffs. See id. 
 10. See Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).  
 12. Id. 
 13. 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3661.1 (4th ed. 2016). 
 14. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 15. See, e.g., Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 16. See, e.g., Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 17. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 527 (4th 
Cir. 2014). 
 18. See U.S. Companies Using International Expansion to Drive Growth and 
Profitability, BUS. WIRE (Aug. 13, 2013, 11:42 AM), http://www.businesswire.com 
/news/home/20130813006035/en/U.S.-Companies-International-Expansion-Drive 
-Growth-Profitability#.Vg1DpXpViko [https://perma.cc/AWN4-8M6P] (stating 
that in a recent survey of 161 company executives, two-thirds expect international 
markets to be among their company’s top priorities over the next three years). 
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in ATS litigation magnifies the need for the courts to have a uniform and 
identified approach for when the ATS can be used as a means for 
jurisdiction. Not only do potential plaintiffs need to be informed about 
whether and when they may seek the benefit of U.S. courts as a venue for 
redress, but potential defendants also need to be informed about when they 
might be forced to defend against liability actions in the United States. 
Non-citizen plaintiffs might have several reasons for bringing a claim in 
federal district court under the ATS as opposed to another tribunal. 
Foreign claimants might view the federal courts as being more fair than 
the courts in their home countries because of the independent judiciary and 
favorable procedural rules found in the U.S.19 Furthermore, access to any 
court in a particular claimant’s home country might be extremely 
difficult.20 Additionally, ATS defendant corporations, without clear 
guidelines as to when they might face liability for actions taken abroad, 
are forced to conduct their business with uncertainty. 
Unfortunately, neither the United States Congress nor the Supreme 
Court has given definitive direction as to when a claim is justiciable under 
the ATS, and more importantly, as to when a corporation can be sued in 
the U.S. for actions committed in a foreign nation. In a recent landmark 
case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Supreme Court held that 
the federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to hear claims against 
corporations for actions occurring wholly outside the United States.21 
Nevertheless, the Court issued a perplexing statement in dicta: “[E]ven 
where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they 
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application.”22 Although indirectly stated, this language 
suggests that actions that “touch and concern” the United States with 
sufficient force are justiciable before the federal courts. However, the 
                                                                                                             
 19. See, e.g., Joseph T. McLaughlin & Justin H. Bell, New Limitations on the 
Exercise of Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute, SN066 ALI-ABA 199, 201 
(2008) (noting that in particular, the ATS has become a popular tool of foreign 
litigants seeking access to the sympathetic juries and streamlined class-action 
mechanisms of U.S. courts).  
 20. See Chris DeLaubenfels, Note, The Problem with the Duty to Adjudicate: 
How Mediations Can Promote International Human Rights, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. 
& POL. 541, 545–46 (2014) (citing U.S. INST. FOR PEACE & U.S. ARMY 
PEACEKEEPING AND STABILITY OPERATIONS INST., GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR 
STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 7–86 (2009) (arguing that no access to 
justice exists when citizens fear the system and the justice system is inaccessible 
or incomprehensible)). 
 21. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 22. Id. at 1669. 
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Court’s failure to provide guidelines for the touch and concern doctrine 
has led to disparity among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals.  
The disparity among the circuits evidences the need for a solution that 
will create uniformity in the application of the touch and concern doctrine. 
Part I of this Comment provides a brief introduction to the history and 
scope of the ATS. Part II examines the unresolved issue of corporate 
liability under the ATS by exploring the holdings of seminal cases. Part 
III proposes three factors that courts should utilize in determining whether 
a claim sufficiently “touches and concerns” the United States: first, the 
citizenship of the defendant; second, the location of the conduct; and third, 
the nature of the alleged violation. Utilization of these factors will provide 
corporations with greater certainty regarding their liability for business 
conducted overseas and provide clarity to a statute that has been engulfed 
by ambiguity since its inception. 
I. HISTORY AND SCOPE OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
Pursuant to the ATS, United States district courts have original 
jurisdiction over any civil action brought by an alien, for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.23 Dissecting this short statute suggests that a complaint under the 
ATS must allege three elements: first, that the plaintiff is an alien; second, 
that the plaintiff is suing for a tort; and third, that the tort was committed 
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.24 On its 
face, therefore, the ATS could mistakenly be perceived as an 
uncomplicated statute with a simple application. 
A. Origins of the ATS 
The ATS has a complex history and raison d’être and is continually 
the subject of contrasting interpretation and implementation. Indeed, the 
ATS has been described as a “legal Lohengrin”25 with an unclear origin, 
even though it has existed since the First Congress enacted it in 1789.26 
                                                                                                             
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 24. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Estate of Amergi 
v. Palestinian Auth., 611 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2010).  
 25. Lohengrin is the hero of Richard Wagner’s opera of the same name. 
Lohengrin is depicted as a knight of the Holy Grail and refuses to reveal, even to 
his wife, the mystery of his origins. BRIAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF 
MODERN LEGAL USAGE 532 (2d ed. 2001). 
 26. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated 
on other grounds by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
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Commentators have suggested that the statute is rooted in the following 
federal powers: the grant of federal question jurisdiction under Article III 
of the U.S. Constitution, the authority of the courts to interpret treaties, 
and the national government’s power over international relations.27 The 
“most basic original goal” of the statute was to enable federal courts to 
hear cases affecting foreign relations to the exclusion of state courts.28 
However, the intended practical effect of the statute, particularly with 
respect to corporations, is a matter still open to interpretation. 
Courts continue to wrestle with the determination of what causes of 
action should be recognized under a claim involving the ATS.29 The ATS 
is a purely jurisdictional statute that by itself does not create a statutory 
cause of action for aliens. It was meant to have immediate practical effect 
from the moment it became law, by providing the basis for district courts 
to exercise jurisdiction over a modest number of causes of action 
recognized under the law of nations, such as offenses against ambassadors, 
violations of safe conduct, and possibly for piracy.30 Although these three 
causes of action have largely been recognized as providing jurisdiction, no 
definitive answer exists as to what type of claim would provide jurisdiction 
under the present-day law of nations.31 
B. Scope of the ATS 
Understanding the jurisdictional reach of the ATS is imperative to 
forming a determination as to corporate liability under the statute. To 
furnish jurisdiction, the ATS provides that a potential alien claimant needs 
to allege a tort committed in violation of the law of nations,32 also called 
“customary international law,” or a treaty of the United States, generally 
including war crimes and crimes against humanity.33 Although traditional 
                                                                                                             
 27. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3661.1. 
 28. John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1006 (S.D. Ind. 
2007) (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714–19 (2004)). 
 29. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720, 724–25. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See, e.g., id.  
 32. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States (Revised): Tentative Draft No. 3, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 653, 655 (1982) 
(noting that an international law is violated for the commission of genocide; 
slavery or slave trade; the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals; 
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged 
arbitrary detention; systematic racial discrimination; or consistent patterns of 
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights). 
 33. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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causes of action providing for jurisdiction appear somewhat settled, 
determining what causes of action can provide jurisdiction under present-
day international law requires an exploration of jurisprudence and the role 
of custom in developing international law. 
1. Jurisdictional Reach of the ATS According to Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain 
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court attempted not only to 
clarify the jurisdictional reach of the ATS, but also to explain how the 
statute applies to current issues that its drafters perhaps did not envision.34 
The Court found that the ATS provides jurisdiction only when the 
violation alleged is sufficiently definite and historically rooted in the 
context of international law norms.35 Additionally, even when a colorable 
claim for a violation of an international law norm is sufficiently set forth, 
the cause of action must be among one of the modest number of 
international law violations that carry the potential for personal liability 
traditionally recognized under the ATS.36 Subsequent courts referred to 
this analysis as a two-step test: first, the court must determine whether 
there was a violation of a recognized crime against humanity committed 
by the defendant; subsequently, if there was such a violation, the court 
must determine whether the crime falls within the restricted group of 
claims for which the ATS furnishes jurisdiction.37  
To determine which violations Congress intended to furnish with 
jurisdiction, the Court looked to the legislative intent of the drafters and to 
Blackstone’s Commentaries.38 These sources disclosed three relevant 
violations: offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and 
piracy.39 However, the Court recognized that jurisdiction under the ATS 
is not so rigid and limited as to preclude federal courts from recognizing 
torts beyond the three that the First Congress contemplated because major 
developments in international law have occurred since the ATS was 
enacted.40 Nevertheless, expansion of the ATS through the recognition of 
torts beyond the three offenses initially contemplated should be subject to 
limitations. 
                                                                                                             
 34. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 315–16 (D. 
Mass. 2013). 
 38. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719–20. 
 39. See id. at 720. 
 40. See id. at 724–25. 
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2. Contemporary Crimes Recognized as Violating International 
Norms 
The Court in Sosa made clear that the expansion of the ATS is strictly 
limited to those acts that violate a norm of international character that is 
accepted by the “civilized world” and is defined specifically enough to 
compare to one of the three international law violations that carried the 
potential for personal liability when the statute was enacted.41 Under this 
rule, courts have held that the following crimes constitute a violation of an 
international norm, thereby providing jurisdiction under the ATS: 
slavery,42 discrimination or persecution,43 and official torture.44 
In addition to these violations, the scope of the original three violations 
articulated in Sosa45—offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe 
conduct, and piracy—has evolved and developed. For example, piracy 
                                                                                                             
 41. Offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy. See id. 
 42. See Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014). Three 
former child slaves, who were forced to harvest cocoa in the Ivory Coast, brought 
a class action against the multinational companies that controlled production of 
Ivorian cocoa, alleging that the companies were liable under the ATS for aiding 
and abetting child slavery in the Ivory Coast. The court, reversing the district 
court’s decision, held that the prohibition against slavery was a universal norm of 
international law that supported a claim under the ATS, and that the plaintiffs 
sufficiently pleaded the required mens rea for aiding and abetting. The case was 
remanded to allow the plaintiffs to amend their petition in light of the decision in 
Kiobel, to prove that Nestlé USA’s conduct sufficiently “touched and concerned” 
the United States. 
 43. See Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass. 
2013). The court determined that persecution of sexual minorities was a crime 
against humanity. The defendant allegedly aided and abetted this persecution from 
the United States. For persecution to reach the level of a crime against humanity, 
it typically must involve more than the “intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the 
group or collectivity.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 
7(2)(g), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S 38544. The persecution must also have been 
proved to be “part of a widespread or systematic attack” to qualify as a crime 
against humanity. 
 44. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884–87 (2d Cir. 1980). Citizens 
of Paraguay brought action against another citizen of Paraguay for allegedly 
causing the death of their son through torture. The United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York dismissed the action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that deliberate torture 
violates international law of human rights regardless of the nationalities of the 
parties, thus providing jurisdiction under the ATS. 
 45. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720. 
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might typically be associated with individuals with a peg leg or an eye 
patch roaming the high seas while unlawfully boarding and pillaging 
innocent vessels.46 However, the United States Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals recently held that a whale conservation group’s actions, which 
included ramming, threatening, and throwing acid onto alleged whale 
hunters’ ships, constituted piracy, even though the group believed it was 
engaged in a noble purpose.47 As a result, jurisdiction under the ATS has 
been expanded to include more than just the original three violations of 
international law the First Congress envisioned, despite the Court’s 
admonition in Sosa48 to strictly limit the expansion of jurisdiction under 
the ATS.  
3. The Role of Custom 
Custom plays an important role in developing what constitutes an 
international norm under Sosa’s two-step analysis. Customary practices 
rise to the level of international law under certain circumstances. 
Generally, a customary practice becomes a binding norm of international 
law if it is a common and consistent practice that nations follow because 
they feel a sense of legal obligation.49 Nations must adhere to the practice 
because they believe international law requires it, not simply “because 
they think it is a good idea, or politically useful, or otherwise desirable.”50 
The notion that custom can occupy such a role in the law is not new. In The 
Paquete Habana from 1900, the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
“international law is part of our law and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice.”51 The administration of international 
law, the Court explained, might involve considering the customs and usages 
of other “civilized nations” and the work of commentators and jurists.52 
Comprehending the type of activity for which a corporation might face 
liability when doing business overseas is in the corporation’s best interest. 
                                                                                                             
 46. See Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc., 725 
F.3d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25. 
 49. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3661.1 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1987)); see also U.S. v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(stating the process by which courts ought to derive customary international law 
from state practice and opinio juris). 
 50. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d at 1252. 
 51. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 52. Id. 
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An understanding of the role of custom in shaping international law as well 
as an acknowledgment of what crimes constitute a violation cognizable 
under the ATS is fundamental in assessing liability under the statute. Such 
an understanding enables defendants to better predict violations and conduct 
their businesses with certainty. However, the level of activity necessary to 
trigger the application of the statute is unclear at best. 
II. CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
Questions concerning liability for actions carried out overseas are not 
unique to present-day corporations. As the ATS increasingly became the 
focus of non-citizens’ claims53 following Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,54 
questions arose as to whether and when a corporation can be haled into a 
federal district court for torts the corporation allegedly committed 
overseas. This case served as a catalyst for the discussion of corporate 
liability under the ATS. 
A. Tensions Between the Circuits Prior to the Second Circuit’s Decision 
in Kiobel 
After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,55 it was not uncommon for a corporation 
to be haled into federal district court under the ATS. For example, in a 
Ninth Circuit case, Burmese nationals brought an action under the ATS 
against a U.S. oil company for allegedly aiding in the killing, torturing, 
and illegal detention of individuals in furtherance of a project to lay 
pipeline in Burma.56 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that 
private individuals and corporations were subject to liability under the 
ATS for actions committed in Colombia.57 In this case, Colombian 
nationals sued a United States soft drinks licensor, Coca-Cola, and its 
                                                                                                             
 53. See, e.g., McLaughlin & Bell, supra note 19, at 204. In the decades 
following Filartiga, the ATS gained popularity as a tool for pursuing high-profile 
human and labor rights cases against individuals, governmental agents, and 
corporations. 
 54. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).  
 55. Id. 
 56. Nat'l Coal. Gov’t of Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 334 
(C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 57. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogated 
by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012). 
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Colombian subsidiary for collaborating with paramilitary forces to murder 
and torture the nationals.58 
Courts have justified corporate liability under the ATS by looking to 
the historical placement of liability and jurisprudence, both domestic and 
international. The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York recognized that historically, states—and to a lesser extent, 
individuals—have been held liable for crimes under international law.59 
The court in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. went 
further, stating that considerable international and United States precedent 
“indicates that corporations may also be held liable under international 
law, at least for gross human rights violations.”60 
Although the Second Circuit has not unequivocally held that 
corporations are potentially liable for violations of the law of nations, it 
has considered numerous cases61 in which plaintiffs sued corporations 
under the ATS for alleged breaches of international law. In each of these 
cases, the Second Circuit acknowledged that corporations are potentially 
liable for violations of the law of nations that ordinarily entail individual 
responsibility.62 This precedent from the Second Circuit indicates that 
actions under the ATS against corporations for substantial violations of 
international law can be viewed as “the norm rather than the exception.”63 
Courts have further expanded this precedent, such that the general 
consensus is that corporations should not be immune from tort liability 
under the ATS.64 
In addition to the apparent jurisprudential consensus that corporations 
can face liability under the ATS, scholars have emphasized and even urged 
expansion of the precedent to other areas of the law. One commentator 
suggested that, under ATS precedent, human rights laws should also 
extend to private corporations despite significant confusion and the lack 
                                                                                                             
 58. Id. at 1263 (alleging the corporation had collaborated with Colombian 
paramilitary forces to murder and torture them). 
 59. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 
2d 289, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 60. Id. at 319. 
 61. See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); Bigio v. 
Coca–Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 62. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 313. 
 63. See id. at 319. 
 64. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Product Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that defendants presented no policy reason why 
corporations should be uniquely exempt from tort liability under the ATS, and no 
court has presented one either). 
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of extensive early attention to private corporate liability for human rights 
deprivations.65 Another commentator went so far as to urge expansion of 
corporate liability under the ATS for certain corporations’ actions that 
cause massive environmental degradation.66 As court decisions and 
scholarly opinions evidence, before Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co.,67 subjecting corporations to liability under the ATS for violations of 
international law perpetrated in a foreign nation was not uncommon. 
However, this trend came to an abrupt halt in Kiobel. 
B. The Second Circuit’s Clear Answer 
Kiobel provided an opportunity for the Second Circuit to address 
definitively the issue of corporate liability under the ATS. If the general 
consensus had been that the ATS provided for jurisdiction over corporate 
defendants, the Second Circuit deviated from that consensus in Kiobel.68 
The case appeared not only to limit, but also to preclude the finding of 
jurisdiction against a corporation under the ATS.  
1. Facts and Procedural History 
Nigerian nationals residing in the United States filed suit in federal 
district court under the ATS, alleging that the defendants—certain Dutch, 
British, and Nigerian corporations engaged in oil exploration—aided and 
abetted the Nigerian government in committing violations of the law of 
nations in Nigeria.69 Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed the corporations 
aided and abetted extrajudicial killings; crimes against humanity; torture 
or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest and detention; 
violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association; forced 
exile; and property destruction.70 The district court dismissed a number of 
the plaintiffs’ claims, but denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss with 
respect to aiding and abetting arbitrary arrest and detention; crimes against 
humanity; and torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.71 
                                                                                                             
 65. Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 
35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801, 802–03 (2002). 
 66. See Richard L. Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act: A Practical Assessment, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 545, 621 (2000). 
 67. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 117. 
 70. Id. at 123. 
 71. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 464–67 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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Additionally, the district court certified its order for interlocutory appeal 
to the Second Circuit.72 This dismissal provided the Second Circuit with 
the opportunity to address corporate liability under the ATS. 
2. Corporate Liability 
The Second Circuit found that corporate liability is not a rule of 
customary international law because corporate liability is not recognized as 
a “specific, universal, and obligatory norm.”73 In the court’s view, 
“imposing liability on corporations for violations of customary international 
law ha[d] not attained a discernable, much less universal, acceptance among 
nations.”74 This view, however, was not shared unanimously. 
In contrast with the majority’s opinion, Judge Leval’s concurrence 
renounced a complete bar to corporate liability under the ATS, believing 
the lack of liability deals a substantial blow to international law and its 
undertaking to protect fundamental human rights.75 Judge Leval expressed 
that despite any support in either the precedents or the scholarship of 
international law, the majority still believed that corporations are not 
subject to international law.76 To Judge Leval, such a position affords 
violators of fundamental human rights the freedom to retain any profits so 
earned without liability to their victims.77 Despite Judge Leval’s 
concurrence, the majority’s limitation on corporate liability appeared to 
provide a definitive answer under the ATS. No such clear answer existed, 
however. Instead, confusion ensued after Kiobel because the Second 
Circuit’s statements regarding corporate liability were merely dicta. 
Further, opportunities to decide corporate liability under the ATS did not 
present themselves to the other circuits. 
3. Subsequent Decisions 
After the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel, lower district courts 
remained divided on the issue of corporate liability under the ATS. Some 
decisions seemed to affirm the Kiobel majority’s reasoning and holding, 
while others followed the principles that the concurring opinion 
                                                                                                             
 72. Id. at 468. 
 73. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 136. 
 74. Id. at 145. 
 75. Id. at 149–50 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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articulated.78 In Kaplan v. Jazeera, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York expressly relied on Kiobel to hold that the 
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claim 
because the plaintiffs were seeking to hold the defendant corporation liable 
for war crimes and violations of the law of nations under the ATS.79 
Similarly, in In re Motors Liquidation Co., the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the Southern District of New York held that United States courts 
do not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate cases brought under 
the ATS when the allegations are against a corporation.80 In re Motors 
involved a contested matter in which the plaintiffs, who were residents of 
South Africa, claimed to be victims of the apartheid system, which the 
defendant corporations had allegedly aided and abetted.81 The court stated 
that it was bound by the Second Circuit’s holding in Kiobel to find that 
corporate liability had not attained a discernable acceptance among nations 
and thus could not form the basis of jurisdiction under the ATS.82 
In contrast, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois in Holocaust Victims of Bank Theft v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank agreed 
with the concurring opinion in Kiobel.83 The court found “a sufficient legal 
basis to hold corporations liable under the ATS for genocide.”84 The court 
also found that “recognition of the humanitarian objectives of the law of 
nations makes it unlikely that this body of law intend[ed] to exempt 
corporations from its prohibitions or to provide a substantial financial 
incentive85 to violate the most fundamental of human rights.”86 Various 
other courts have also taken the position that the ATS does not preclude 
                                                                                                             
 78. Compare Kaplan v. Jazeera, No. 10 CIV. 5298, 2011 WL 2314783, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2011), with Holocaust Victims of Bank Theft v. Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank, 807 F. Supp. 2d 689 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 79. Kaplan, 2011 WL 2314783, at *8.  
 80. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 447 B.R. 150, 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. See also Viera v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 1:09–CV–0495–RLY–DML, 
2010 WL 3893791 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2010) (holding that the ATS does not 
provide federal court jurisdiction over claims based on a corporation’s voluntary 
actions). 
 83. Holocaust Victims, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 689; see also Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F. 3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 84. Holocaust Victims, 807 F. Supp. 2d. at 694. 
 85. If a corporation would not face liability for actions it conducted wholly in 
another country, that corporation might be financially incentivized, for example, to 
carry out operations in a country with no child labor laws. Id. at 695 (citing Kiobel, 
621 F. 3d at 159).  
 86. Id. 
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corporate liability.87 The continued disparity among the courts, even after 
the decision in Kiobel, made the issue of corporate liability ripe for the 
Supreme Court’s review. The opportunity for certiorari appeared when the 
petitioners in Kiobel appealed to the nation’s highest court for redress.88 
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Kiobel 
A definitive answer to the question of corporate liability under the 
ATS seemed promising when the Supreme Court granted certiorari.89 The 
Court ordered supplemental briefing on whether and under what 
circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the ATS 
against corporations for violations of the law of nations occurring within 
the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.90 Ultimately, 
Kiobel has added to the growing list of cases that have failed to definitively 
address the issue of corporate liability. 
1. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
The Court began its analysis by clarifying that the question at issue 
was not whether the plaintiffs stated a proper claim under the ATS, but 
whether a claim may reach conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign 
sovereign.91 The defendants argued that claims under the ATS do not reach 
conduct occurring in foreign countries, relying primarily on a canon of 
statutory interpretation known as the “presumption against extraterritorial 
application.”92 This canon provides that “‘when a statute gives no clear 
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none,’ and reflects the 
‘presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not 
rule the world.’”93 This longstanding principle of U.S. law articulates that 
Congressional legislation applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States unless a contrary intent appears.94  
                                                                                                             
 87. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 
vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 88. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). 
 89. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1664. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (first quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 
2878 (2010); and then quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 
1758 (2007)). 
 94. See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extrater 
ritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 124 (1998). 
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The presumption serves to protect against unintended conflict between 
the laws of the United States and those of other nations, which could result 
in international discord.95 The Supreme Court in Kiobel highlighted this 
policy and stated that the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in 
foreign policy is magnified in the context of the ATS because the courts, 
rather than the lawmakers, shape important policy decisions.96 The Court 
found that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to the ATS 
in general and to the plaintiffs’ case for redress in particular.97 This 
presumption operated as a bar to the plaintiffs’ cause of action98 because 
all of the alleged wrongs that the plaintiffs had suffered occurred outside 
the United States.99  
While the majority discussed the application of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, Justice Breyer’s concurrence, which Justices 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined, offered a contrasting viewpoint. 
The concurrence stated that the Court’s utilization of the presumption 
against extraterritorial application offers limited help in addressing the 
question before the Court.100 This question was under what circumstances 
the ATS would allow a court to recognize a cause of action for violations 
of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a country other than 
the United States.101 The concurrence recognized that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality does not preclude a finding of liability for foreign 
actions.102 Rather, the question still remains open as to what circumstances 
the ATS will furnish jurisdiction over claims that involve a defendant’s 
actions in a foreign nation. 
2. Corporate Liability 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s holding in Kiobel that the 
plaintiffs could not sue the corporate defendants in U.S. court, the majority 
went further and stated, “On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place 
                                                                                                             
 95. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991). See also Sexual 
Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 322–23 (D. Mass. 2013) 
(stating that the presumption against extraterritoriality is based in large part on 
foreign policy concerns that tend to arise when domestic statutes are applied to 
foreign nationals engaging in conduct in foreign countries). 
 96. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. 
 97. Id. at 1665. 
 98. Id. at 1669. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 101. Id. at 1672–73. 
 102. Id. 
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outside the United States. And even where the claims touch and concern 
the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to 
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”103 This 
perplexing statement suggests that an unconditional bar to corporate 
liability under the ATS does not exist. One commentator noted that the 
dicta in the majority opinion can be read in one of two ways: either the 
opinion limits the scope of the holding to cases involving no conduct 
within the United States that contributes to human rights abuses overseas, 
or it suggests that a case with different facts might be justiciable for foreign 
conduct involving the abuse of human rights.104 
The Supreme Court did not directly preclude corporations from 
liability under the ATS as the Second Circuit had done;105 rather, the Court 
limited the statute’s reach by finding that federal courts lack jurisdiction 
to hear cases against corporations for actions occurring wholly outside the 
United States. Thus, the presumption against extraterritorial application is 
arguably rebuttable when claims touch and concern the territory of the 
United States.106 The majority, however, offered no explanation as to the 
meaning of “touch and concern” or as to the level of contact needed to 
rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
D. Confusion After the Supreme Court’s Decision in Kiobel 
As Justice Kennedy recognized, the Court left “open a number of 
significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation” of the ATS.107 
The Court’s failure to answer definitively whether corporations may face 
liability under the ATS has again led to disparity among U.S. circuit 
courts. 
In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., the Fourth Circuit 
found that the plaintiffs could sue U.S. companies for the defendant’s 
actions committed in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.108 In contrast, in 
                                                                                                             
 103. Id. at 1669 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citing Morrison v. Nat’l 
Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883–88 (2010)). 
 104. Ross J. Corbett, Kiobel, Bauman, and the Presumption Against the 
Extraterritorial Application of the Alien Tort Statute, 13 NW. U.J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 
50, 9 (2015). 
 105. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 106. For a discussion of the “touch and concern” doctrine see Alex S. Moe, A 
Test by Any Other Name: The Influence of Justice Breyer’s Concurrence in Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 225, 286 (2014). 
 107. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
 108. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014). 
Four Iraqi citizens brought an action against a U.S. military contractor, alleging 
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Cardona v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit 
found that the defendant could not be sued in federal court over allegations 
that it supported Colombian paramilitary forces that tortured and killed 
banana plantation workers, union members, and social activists in 
Colombia.109 Similarly, in Balintulo v. Daimler AG, South Africans sued 
a foreign corporation, Daimler AG, and two U.S. corporations, IBM and 
Ford, for alleged complicity in apartheid.110 The Second Circuit dismissed 
the touch and concern language in the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel 
as mere dicta and dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit under the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.111 
As the circuit split regarding corporate liability evidences,112 whether 
and at what point a corporation engages in conduct that touches and 
concerns the United States, thereby conferring jurisdiction over the claim 
to the federal district courts, is still unclear. 
III. PROPOSED FACTORS COURTS SHOULD USE TO DETERMINE 
THE MEANING OF “TOUCH AND CONCERN” 
Because of the confusion among federal courts, both plaintiffs and 
defendant corporations need guidance to determine what type of conduct 
touches and concerns the United States and to rebut the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and confer jurisdiction under the ATS. The courts should 
adopt the following factors to guide this primary determination: the 
citizenship of the defendant; the location of the conduct; and the nature of 
the alleged violation. Each factor constitutes an independently sufficient 
basis for overcoming the presumption against extraterritoriality. If the 
defendant is a citizen of the United States, if the alleged wrongful conduct 
occurred in the United States, or if the alleged wrong is a violation of the 
law of nations in which the United States has a distinct interest, the conduct 
will touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to rebut the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. 
                                                                                                             
that the plaintiffs were abused and tortured during their detention at Abu Ghraib 
prison in Iraq as suspected enemy combatants. 
 109. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Does 1–144 v. Chiquita 
Brands Int'l, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1853 (2015). 
 110. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 111. Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190 (2d Cir. 2013) (denying 
petition for writ of mandamus). The panel appeared to interpret the “touch and 
concern” language as addressing only the situation in which some conduct occurs 
abroad and some in the United States. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 112. See, e.g., Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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A. Citizenship of the Defendant 
The status of a defendant as a United States citizen should lead to a 
finding that the plaintiff’s claims touch and concern the United States with 
sufficient force to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. Where 
a defendant corporation is a U.S. citizen, foreign relations are less likely to be 
affected, procedural complications are reduced, and a corporation’s activity 
will more likely be found to touch and concern the United States. Federal 
jurisprudence, international law, and scholarly commentary uniformly 
support this consideration in determining jurisdiction under the ATS. 
Numerous courts have agreed that the citizenship of a corporate defendant 
is a relevant factor to consider and one that could distinguish a case from the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Kiobel. In Du Daobin v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the 
defendant, Cisco, was a U.S. company with offices throughout the United 
States, including Maryland, where the case was brought.113 This situation is 
in contrast to the defendants in Kiobel, which were foreign corporations.114 
The court assumed that the presumption against extraterritoriality did not bar 
the case after the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel because the defendants 
were domiciled in the United States.115  
Furthermore, when the defendant is a United States citizen as opposed to 
a foreign citizen, the potentially complicated issue of haling foreign citizens 
into United States courts to adjudicate issues of liability diminishes. For 
example, in Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, the court emphasized that 
the defendant, Lively, was a U.S. citizen, unlike the British and Dutch 
corporations in Kiobel.116 The court found that the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Kiobel did not bar the ATS claims against a U.S. citizen in part 
because a foreign national was not being haled into an unfamiliar court to 
defend himself.117 
Even in circuits that apply the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
the dissenting opinions suggest that in future cases the courts might find 
that corporate citizenship displaces the presumption.118 Judge Martin’s 
                                                                                                             
 113. Du Daobin v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2 F. Supp. 3d 717 (D. Md. 2014). 
 114. Id. at 728. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 321 (D. Mass. 2013). 
 117. Id. at 322–24. See also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 
516, 530 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding that the case does not present any potential 
problems associated with bringing foreign nationals into United States courts to 
answer for conduct committed abroad, given that the defendants are United States 
citizens). 
 118. See, e.g., Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1192–93 
(11th Cir. 2014) (Martin, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015), cert. 
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dissent in Cardona explains that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel 
offers little guidance as to what kinds of domestic connections overcome the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.119 Judge Martin saw the Cardona case 
as overcoming the presumption of extraterritoriality because, among other 
reasons, the primary defendant, Chiquita, was a corporation headquartered 
and incorporated within the United States.120 Judge Martin concluded that the 
plaintiff’s claims touched and concerned the territory of the United States 
because the plaintiff alleged a U.S. citizen’s violation of international law.121 
Equally, the court in Balintulo v. Daimler AG did not address whether the 
defendant’s U.S. citizenship was enough to rebut the presumption against 
extraterritoriality,122 but the court's language indicated that corporate presence 
in the United States weighs in favor of displacing the presumption.123 
International law also supports the consideration of the defendant’s 
citizenship under the ATS analysis. Under the Restatement of Foreign 
Relations Law, every nation has the authority to regulate the conduct of its 
own citizens, regardless of whether the conduct of those citizens occurs 
inside or outside that nation’s borders.124 Furthermore, other developed 
nations such as Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Holland take the 
approach that extraterritorial torts should be disallowed except for claims 
asserted against their own nationals.125 Even the foreign governments that 
urged the Supreme Court in Kiobel to dismiss the claims against the 
foreign corporations acknowledged in amicus briefs that a claim under the 
                                                                                                             
denied sub nom. Does 1–144 v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1853 (2015); 
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 119. Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1192–93 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  
 122. See generally Balintulo, 727 F.3d 174. 
 123. Recent Case, Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013), 127 
HARV. L. REV. 1493, 1498 (2014) (stating, “the Court’s language signifies that 
corporate presence is an issue of weight rather than relevance for the purposes of 
the ‘touch and concern’ test, thereby leaving the door open for corporate 
nationality to displace the presumption”). 
 124. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 402(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“[A] state has jurisdiction to 
prescribe law with respect to . . . the activities, interests, status, or relations of its 
nationals outside as well as within its territory . . . .”). 
 125. See Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1192–93 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing Brief 
for Gov't of the Kingdom of the Netherlands et al. at 18–23, 21 n.32, Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2010) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 
2312825). 
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ATS would have a “sufficiently close connection” with the United States 
if the defendants were United States citizens.126 
Last, legal commentators have also noted that citizenship might be an 
important factor in determining corporate liability under the ATS. In an 
appraisal issued just one day after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kiobel, 
one commentator, Oona Hathaway,127 observed that the decision allowed 
for “foreign squared” cases to be heard in U.S. courts.128 “Foreign 
squared” cases are those in which the alleged harm occurred on U.S. soil 
or either the plaintiff or defendant is a U.S. citizen.129 Hathaway concluded 
that “the end result of the Supreme Court’s decision . . . may not be the 
end of the ATS after all, but instead a renewed focus of ATS litigation on 
U.S. corporations.”130 The status of an alleged violator of international law 
as a U.S. corporation will likely be the focus in a plaintiff’s argument that 
a specific case touches and concerns the United States.131 United States 
corporations are far more likely to satisfy the touch and concern 
requirement with sufficient force to rebut the presumption against 
extraterritoriality because their headquarters and key personnel are more 
likely to be located in the United States.132 
Although the Supreme Court in Kiobel noted that corporations often 
have a presence in many countries, and corporate presence alone does not 
serve to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality,133 Kiobel 
involved foreign, rather than United States, citizens. American corporations 
have more than a mere corporate presence in the United States by virtue of 
their incorporation in the United States and because they receive the benefits 
and protection of U.S. laws. The distinction between mere corporate 
presence and incorporation was the exact argument the plaintiffs set forth 
                                                                                                             
 126. See id. at 1193. 
 127. Founder and Director of the Center for Global Legal Challenges at Yale 
Law School. See Oona A. Hathaway, YALE L. SCH., https://www.law.yale.edu/oona 
-hathaway [https://perma.cc/Z97L-CZ84] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
 128. Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to “Foreign 
Squared” Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog 
.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases/ 
[perma.cc/X35B-C8QM]. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Anupam Chander, Unshackling Foreign Corporations: Kiobel’s Unexpected 
Legacy, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 829, 830 (2013). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
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in Cardona.134 The dissenting Judge Martin agreed, noting that the 
defendants had more than a mere corporate presence because they were 
incorporated in the United States, providing a crucial difference between 
their case and Kiobel.135 
While some courts have stated that U.S. citizenship is irrelevant to the 
jurisdictional analysis under the ATS, such an argument is not persuasive. 
For example, in Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., the Second Circuit disagreed 
with the contention that a defendant’s U.S. citizenship is relevant to the 
jurisdictional analysis, believing instead that the full “focus” of the ATS 
analysis is on the defendant’s conduct.136 As the Eleventh Circuit has 
recognized, however, the Supreme Court has not completely excluded the 
significance of U.S. citizenship. Particularly, the Eleventh Circuit 
specified that Kiobel did not concern U.S. citizens, and therefore the 
opinion did not reach the merits of the touch and concern analysis.137 
Additionally, the court keenly observed that Kiobel, which did address 
corporate presence within the U.S., indirectly supports the proposition that 
citizenship or corporate status might in fact be relevant to whether a claim 
touches and concerns the territory of the United States.138 The Eleventh 
Circuit noted that after analyzing the facts of the case, the Court in Kiobel 
simply determined that “mere corporate presence” was inadequate.139 
The principles articulated under federal jurisprudence, international 
law, and legal commentary make clear that a corporate defendant’s United 
States citizenship is, at a minimum, relevant to the jurisdictional analysis 
under the ATS. Furthermore, a corporate defendant’s status as a United 
States citizen is sufficient to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. Although the citizenship of the defendant can be a 
dispositive factor, it is not the only factor that will rebut the presumption. 
B. Location of the Conduct 
If part or all of a corporation’s allegedly tortious conduct occurred 
within the United States rather than wholly in a foreign nation, the 
corporation’s actions might touch and concern the United States with 
sufficient force to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
                                                                                                             
 134. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1192–93 (11th Cir. 
2014) (Martin, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015), cert. denied 
sub nom. Does 1–144 v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1853 (2015). 
 135. Id. at 1192–93. 
 136. See Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 189 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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Similar to the citizenship factor, this factor finds sufficient support under 
federal jurisprudence. Moreover, significant foreign policy concerns buttress 
the need of the courts to consider conduct occurring within the United States 
when deciding whether jurisdiction under the ATS is present. 
1. Specific Personal Jurisdiction 
An analogy to specific personal jurisdiction lends support to the 
proposition that conduct that occurs within the United States should 
provide jurisdiction under the ATS. 140 In interpreting the Due Process 
Clause, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a distinction 
between two types of personal jurisdiction: “general” and “specific.”141 A 
state exercises “specific” personal jurisdiction over a defendant when the 
cause of action arises out of the defendant’s contact with the state.142 Although 
the Supreme Court has addressed relatively few cases regarding the ATS, the 
Court has frequently addressed the issue of specific personal jurisdiction. 
One example of specific personal jurisdiction is International Shoe Co. v. 
State of Washington, which involved a corporation that sent salespersons into 
the state of Washington to solicit sales of shoes.143 The company had no other 
contacts with the state.144 The Supreme Court held that the salespersons’ 
contacts with Washington were sufficient for the state to exercise jurisdiction 
over the corporation, as well as to collect taxes from it.145 The Court noted 
that to the extent a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting 
activities within a state, the corporation enjoys the benefits and protection 
of the laws of that state.146 Therefore, the exercise of that privilege may 
give rise to certain obligations,147 which require the corporation to respond 
                                                                                                             
 140. For a further analysis of specific personal jurisdiction see 36 C.J.S. 
Federal Courts § 34 (2012). 
 141. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.15 (1985); 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–15 (1984). 
 142. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudi 
cate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144 (1966).  
 143. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash. Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 
66 S. Ct. 154, 157 (1945). The salespersons resided in Washington, their principal 
activities were confined to that state, and their compensation was based on the 
amount of their sales in that state. The corporation provided its salespersons with a 
line of samples, which they displayed to prospective purchasers. On occasion the 
salespersons rented rooms for exhibiting samples in business buildings. The 
company reimbursed the cost of such rentals. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 160–61. 
 146. Id. at 160. 
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to a suit brought in that jurisdiction.148 Enforcing such obligations cannot 
be said to be excessive.149  
A court’s exercise of specific jurisdiction over a defendant corporation 
can be analogized to a corporation being haled into federal district court in 
the United States under the ATS for allegedly wrongful conduct committed 
in the United States in violation of the law of nations or United States 
treaties. The forum state in a specific jurisdiction analysis is similar to the 
United States in an ATS jurisdictional analysis. As the defendant in 
International Shoe was found to be subject to jurisdiction in Washington,150 
a corporation that voluntarily and intentionally acts in the United States in 
furtherance of a violation of the law of nations abroad should be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States. When a corporation engages in conduct 
in the United States, jurisdiction is proper even though the harm is felt 
abroad. A finding of jurisdiction rests on the principle that subjecting a 
corporation that carries out conduct in the United States to the jurisdiction 
of a federal district court is not unreasonable.151 Further, jurisprudential 
support exists for finding jurisdiction over a corporate defendant under the 
ATS when that defendant has engaged in tortious acts in the United States, 
even if the harm was felt in a foreign nation. 
2. Sufficient Conduct Under the ATS 
In Kiobel, the Supreme Court framed its analysis as focusing solely on 
the location of the relevant “conduct” or “violation.”152 In Balintulo v. 
Daimler AG, the Second Circuit clarified that the phrase “relevant conduct,” 
as used in Kiobel for the touch and concern analysis, referred to the conduct 
constituting the alleged offenses under the law of nations.153 Thus, in 
conducting its extraterritoriality analysis, the court in Balintulo looked 
solely to the site of the alleged violations of customary international law.154 
If the site of these violations was the United States, the court agreed that the 
conduct should be sufficient to touch and concern the United States, thus 
                                                                                                             
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 161. 
 151. This finding of jurisdiction also provides support for the above factor, 
“Citizenship of the Defendant.” See supra Part III.A. 
 152. Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665–69 (2013)). 
 153. Id. at 189–90. 
 154. Id. 
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overcoming the presumption against extraterritoriality.155 Numerous courts 
have applied this reasoning. 
In Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, the court distinguished its case 
from Kiobel because the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendant’s 
tortious acts took place to a substantial degree within the United States.156 
The court reasoned that the plaintiff should not be denied a claim under 
the ATS, even though the impact of the defendant’s conduct was felt in 
Uganda.157 The plaintiff claimed the defendant planned and managed a 
campaign of repression in Uganda from the United States.158 The court 
analogized this conduct to a terrorist who designs and manufactures a 
bomb in the United States, which he then mails to Uganda with the intent 
for it to explode there.159 That the harmful effects of wrongful conduct are 
felt in a foreign nation is simply insufficient to preclude a finding that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality is rebutted when conduct relevant 
to the tort occurs in the United States. Further, the court stated that the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Kiobel is limited in scope—the presumption 
against the extraterritorial application bars suit under the ATS only when 
a defendant's conduct lacks sufficient connection to the United States.160 
In Krishanti v. Rajaratnam,161 the defendants attempted to focus on all 
of the harm to the plaintiffs occurring in Sri Lanka to deny the United 
States court jurisdiction under the ATS. The court, however, found that 
the defendants’ argument would stand only if the plaintiffs were suing the 
defendants for their actions in Sri Lanka.162 The defendants’ actions were 
in fact committed in the United States.163 The actions included the hosting 
of meetings and fundraisers in the United States to raise funds to commit 
                                                                                                             
 155. Id. 
 156. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 321 (D. Mass. 
2013). See also Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1194 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (Martin, J., dissenting) (“[P]laintiffs here do not seek to hold Chiquita 
liable for any of its conduct on foreign soil. Critically, the plaintiffs instead have 
alleged that Chiquita’s corporate officers reviewed, approved, and concealed 
payments and weapons transfers to Colombian terrorist organizations from their 
offices in the United States.”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015), cert. denied 
sub nom. Does 1–144 v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1853 (2015). 
 157. See Sexual Minorities, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 321–22. 
 158. Id. at 309–10. 
 159. Id. at 321–22. 
 160. See id. at 321–22. See also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 
2869, 2884 (2010); Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005). 
 161. Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, No. 2:09-CV-05395(JLL)(JAD), 2014 WL 
1669873 at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2014). 
 162. Id. at *10. 
 163. Id. 
538 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
 
 
 
human rights violations in Sri Lanka, creating United States corporations to 
contribute money to organizations supporting the violations in Sri Lanka, and 
bribing United States officials to remove a terrorist organization from the 
Foreign Terrorist Organization list.164 Because the defendants’ actions 
occurred in the United States, the court found jurisdiction was proper under 
the ATS.165 The Eleventh and Second Circuits also agree that the location of 
the conduct is significant to the analysis.166 
Foreign policy concerns also support holding corporate defendants 
liable when the corporation’s wrongful conduct occurs on U.S. soil. The 
“most basic original goal”167 of the ATS is to allow federal courts to hear 
cases affecting foreign relations and to keep these matters outside the state 
courts’ purview.168 If the United States were to make its courts unavailable 
                                                                                                             
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at *10–11. 
 166. See Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 592 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating 
that in weighing the pertinent facts, the site of the conduct alleged is relevant and 
carries significant weight); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 191 (2d Cir. 
2014) (finding that domestic conduct “touched and concerned” the United States 
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality and to 
establish jurisdiction under the ATS). The defendants carried out multiple actions 
in the United States, including domestic purchases and financing transactions and 
numerous New York-based payments and “financing arrangements” through a 
New York bank account. Id. See also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 
758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding that presumption was displaced in 
part because CACI’s managers in the United States gave tacit approval to the acts 
of torture, attempted to cover up the misconduct, and encouraged it); Mwani v. 
Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that a terrorist attack that was 
plotted in part within the United States and directed at a United States Embassy 
and its employees displaced the presumption); Du Daobin v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2 F. 
Supp. 3d 717, 728 (D.Md. 2014) (observing that Kiobel might be distinguishable 
because “Cisco is an American company” and because plaintiffs alleged that 
Cisco’s actions “took place predominantly, if not entirely, within the United 
States”). 
 167. John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1006 (S.D. Ind. 
2007) (citing Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715–19 (2004)). 
 168. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3661.1. The Continental Congress faced 
this problem several years before the ratification of the Constitution during the 
Marbois incident, which involved an alleged incident of assault and battery 
against a French diplomat in Philadelphia. The French government complained 
about the treatment of the French minister by the state courts, but the state 
judiciary was unapologetic. Congress instructed the national Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs to apologize to the French and to explain “the nature of a federal union” 
and that the “young Nation” needed “many allowances.” By enacting the ATS 
shortly after the ratification of the new Constitution, the First Congress acted to 
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for claims against persons acting in the U.S. who cause injury to people or 
groups overseas, the U.S. would “itself create the potential for just the sort 
of foreign policy complications that the limitations on federal common law 
claims recognized under the ATS are aimed at avoiding.”169 Indeed, under 
the law of nations, nations have a responsibility to make courts accessible 
for claims that foreign claimants bring against individuals who are citizens 
of that nation or who are within the nation’s borders.170 
The location of the wrongful conduct is significant in formulating a 
decision about whether the conduct touches and concerns the United States 
with sufficient force to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
If the alleged conduct occurred within the United States, the presumption 
will likely be overcome, notwithstanding that the effects of the conduct 
materialize in a foreign country. Additionally, even when the location of the 
conduct is unclear, or the conduct does not occur in the United States, 
jurisdiction might be found under the substantive law governing a particular 
alleged violation. 
C. The Nature of the Alleged Violation 
To establish subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS, a plaintiff’s 
allegation of a violation of the law of nations in which the United States 
has a distinct interest should be sufficient. This last factor finds support 
under the concept of universal jurisdiction, which is the legislative intent 
underlying the creation of the ATS and which is conformable to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Kiobel. 
All civilized nations have a duty to eliminate violations of the law of 
nations, which are interpreted in reference to international customary 
                                                                                                             
ensure that the federal government could address such sensitive cases in its own 
courts. See Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Respublica v. De 
Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111 (1784); see also William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ 
Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 
18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 515–22 (1986) (detailing the Framers’ concern to establish 
federal jurisdiction over cases with potential implications for foreign affairs). 
 169. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 322–23 (D. 
Mass. 2013). 
 170. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 783 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Edwards, J. concurring) (stating that if the court’s decision constitutes a 
denial of justice, or if it appears to condone the original wrongful act, under the 
law of nations the United States would become responsible for the failure of its 
courts and be answerable not to the injured alien but to the alien’s home state), 
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). 
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law.171 Despite being relatively limited in scope,172 the doctrine of 
universal jurisdiction allows a nation to prosecute offenses to which it has 
no connection at all. Jurisdiction is based solely on the heinous nature of the 
alleged conduct.173 According to the doctrine, any nation can prosecute 
universal offenses, even over the objection of the defendants’ and victims’ 
home states.174 Allowing the adjudication of claims involving violations of 
the law of nations in United States courts under the ATS does not run 
contrary to established principles of international law. 
Further, the legislative intent underlying the creation and interpretation 
of the ATS supports holding foreign defendants liable in the United States 
when a heinous violation of the law of nations in which the United States 
has a particular interest has occurred. The Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain noted that the “First Congress understood that the district courts 
would recognize private causes of action for certain torts in violation of the 
law of nations.”175 Historically, pirates were thought to be subject to 
jurisdiction in the courts of any nation because they did not operate within 
any jurisdiction.176 Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence in Kiobel that 
like pirates, torturers and perpetrators of genocide are subject to 
jurisdiction wherever they are found.177 They are “common enemies of all 
mankind and all nations have an equal interest in their apprehension and 
punishment.”178 If the Court’s interpretation of the ATS furnishes 
jurisdiction for all claims that violate the law of nations, a fortiori courts 
                                                                                                             
 171. See 2 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 9:23 (2016). For a list of violations deemed cognizable 
under the ATS see supra Part I.B.1. 
 172. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 402(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). A state has jurisdiction to define 
and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of 
nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking 
of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even 
where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is present. Id. 
 173. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal 
Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 183 (2004). 
 174. See id. 
 175. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). 
 176. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1667 (2013). 
 177. See id. at 1670–76 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 178. Id. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 404 n.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting In re Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 556 (N.D.Ohio 1985)). 
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should have jurisdiction under the ATS to hear violations of the law of 
nations in which the United States has a specific interest.179 
Moreover, the United States Congress is undoubtedly aware of cases in 
which courts have awarded civil damages under the ATS for violations of 
the law of nations, and Congress has not sought to limit the jurisdictional or 
substantive reach of the ATS.180 For example, in 1980 the Second Circuit 
decided Filartiga,181 which involved a group of citizens from Paraguay 
who alleged that the defendant, also a citizen of Paraguay, wrongfully 
caused the death of a family member. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant tortured and killed the family member in retaliation for the family 
member’s father’s political actions and beliefs.182 The court held that the 
ATS furnished jurisdiction and awarded the plaintiffs approximately $10 
million in damages.183 Indeed, Congress has enacted other statutes, both 
civil and criminal in nature, that allow the U.S. to prosecute or allow victims 
to obtain damages from foreign persons who injure foreign victims by 
                                                                                                             
 179. The Eleventh Circuit believes jurisdiction for violations of the law of 
nations should be limited. In Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. the court 
stated that it would potentially deny ATS claims alleging torture, employing in 
part a narrow reading of Sosa. 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 1842 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Does 1-144 v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1853 (2015). This language suggests the Eleventh Circuit would 
limit actionable claims under the ATS to those primary offenses that existed when 
the ATS was enacted. Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit’s comments are dicta; the 
court ultimately dismissed the action because the relevant conduct occurred 
outside the United States and did not “touch and concern the United States.” Id. 
at 1189. Judge Martin’s dissent parallels other cases that furnish jurisdiction under 
the ATS for a violation of the law of nations. Specifically, he argues that U.S. 
corporate sponsorship of torture should be potentially actionable, despite the 
torture’s occurrence outside the United States. Id. at 1192–93.  
 180. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1677 (Breyer, J. concurring). If Congress did 
wish to limit the jurisdictional or substantive reach, Congress could do so. For 
example, in 2013, Congress passed a revised Stolen Valor Act after the Supreme 
Court invalidated the earlier version in June 2012. In United States v. Alvarez, the 
Court held that the prohibition on making false claims about receiving military 
honors violated the First Amendment’s protection for freedom of speech. 132 S. 
Ct. 2537 (2012). Subsequently, Congress revised the Act so that only making false 
claims about military honors for financial gain or some other profit is a crime. 
 181. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that deliberate 
torture violates international law of human rights regardless of the nationalities of 
the parties, thus providing jurisdiction under the ATS). 
 182. See id. at 878. 
 183. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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committing heinous acts such as torture or genocide while abroad.184 A 
number of these statutes were enacted after Filartiga.185 Because Congress 
has not attempted to limit the jurisdictional scope of the ATS, defendant 
corporations that allegedly violate the law of nations should be subject to 
jurisdiction under the ATS when the United States has a specific interest 
in adjudication of the claim. 
Last, granting United States courts jurisdiction over claims in which 
the country has a distinct interest conforms to the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Kiobel. To furnish jurisdiction under the ATS before the decision in 
Kiobel, a claim’s allegation that a violation of the law of nations had 
occurred might have been sufficient.186 The Court added another layer to 
the jurisdictional analysis, however, through its touch and concern 
language in Kiobel. This new layer is evidenced by the fact that the crimes 
alleged in Kiobel were violations of the law of nations, but the Court 
declined to furnish jurisdiction under the ATS.187 The factor proposed is 
in line with the Court’s decision in Kiobel because a claim touches and 
concerns the United States when the claim involves a violation of the law 
of nations in which the United States has a specific interest in prosecuting.  
Certain violations of the law of nations specifically concern the United 
States and should be heard in the United States federal courts. The 
historical example of such a violation is piracy.188 This crime persists 
today and affects both the United States economy and its citizens. 
Transportation of goods by water contributed $36 billion and 64,000 jobs 
to the U.S. economy in 2010.189 By value, shipping vessels carry 53% and 
                                                                                                             
 184. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(b)(2) (2012) (authorizing prosecution of 
torturers if “the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the 
nationality of the victim or alleged offender”); § 1091(e)(2)(D) (genocide prosecution 
authorized when “regardless of where the offense is committed, the alleged offender 
is . . . present in the United States”); Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, §2(a), 
Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (creating a private right of action on behalf of 
individuals harmed by an act of torture or extrajudicial killing committed “under 
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation”); Kiobel, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1677. 
 185. See supra note 184. 
 186. John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1006 (S.D. Ind. 2007). 
 187. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
 188. See Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What 
Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 111, 132 (2004). 
 189. See MATTHEW CHAMBERS & MINDY LIU, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
MARITIME TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION BY THE NUMBERS (2011), http://www 
.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/by_the_numbers/maritime_
trade_and_transportation/index.html [https://perma.cc/X2EG-6PAF]. 
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38% of U.S. imports and exports, respectively—the largest share of any 
mode of transportation.190 Although a popular mode of transportation, this 
industry is increasingly facing the threat of piracy.191 Not only does piracy 
endanger the lives and cargo on board both U.S. ships and foreign vessels 
travelling to the U.S.,192 but it also has economic implications.193 Because 
of the prominence of the maritime shipping industry within the United 
States, the federal courts have a special interest in adjudicating piracy 
cases. 
If a defendant corporation is alleged to have violated the law of nations 
and the United States has a distinct interest in the adjudication of the 
violation, the corporation should be subject to the jurisdiction of United 
States courts under the ATS. As one court keenly observed, if corporations 
are capable of being found liable for war crimes, as indeed they are, then 
logically, corporations should be capable of being found liable for other 
international crimes.194 This factor, along with the citizenship of the 
defendant and the location of the conduct, will provide certainty in an area 
of the law engulfed in ambiguity. 
CONCLUSION 
The courts, as well as plaintiffs and defendant corporations, would 
benefit tremendously from direction as to when conduct will “touch and 
concern” the United States with sufficient force to rebut the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. No clear consensus exists as to whether or when 
                                                                                                             
 190. Id. 
 191. For example, the number of piracy incidents worldwide increased 68% 
from 2000 to 2006, compared to the previous six-year period. See Increase in Piracy 
and Terrorism At Sea; Little Evidence Supports Fear That the Two Crimes Are 
Merging, RAND CORP. (June 5, 2008), http://www.rand.org/news/press/2008/06 
/05.html [https://perma.cc/P6MD-3ZBP]. 
 192. See, e.g., Pirates Kidnap Two Americans in Ship Attack off Coast of Nigeria, 
FOX NEWS (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/10/24/americans-
kidnapped-by-pirates-off-coast-nigeria-official-says/[https://perma.cc/5EET-CQ8R]; 
Mark Mazzetti and Sharon Otterman, U.S. Captain Is Hostage of Pirates; Navy Ship 
Arrives, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/09/world/af 
rica /09pirates.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/WM77-Y942]. 
 193. According to international shipping organizations, insurance rates for ships 
rose from an estimated $500 per voyage in 2008 to $20,000 per voyage in 2009—a 
40-fold increase—because of piracy. See Raymond Gilpin, Counting the Costs of 
Somali Piracy (June 22, 2009) (working paper) (on file with the Louisiana Law 
Review), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/57MG-UZ4X]. 
 194. William v. AES Corp., 28 F. Supp. 3d 553, 566 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
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a non-citizen under the ATS may hale into court a corporation for a harm 
the corporation causes overseas. Having a set of factors available for 
courts to utilize in determining jurisdiction will provide greater uniformity 
between the circuits, as well as certainty for litigants. Courts should 
consider the citizenship of the defendant, the location of the conduct, and 
the nature of the claimed violation when determining whether a claim 
sufficiently “touches and concerns” the United States for purposes of ATS 
jurisdiction. If the specific claim is relevant to one of these factors, the 
claim should be justiciable under the ATS because it rebuts the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. Utilization of these factors would 
allow corporations to conduct their businesses with greater certainty, while 
allowing plaintiffs to save time and resources on claims under which the 
ATS would ultimately not provide jurisdiction. 
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